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Situation III.
CUBA NEUTRAL.
[It is granted that the Declaration of London is binding.]
There is war between the United States and State X.
Other States are neutral. Supplies of the nature of con-
ditional contraband are being carried by merchant ves-
sels of State Y to Habana, whence they are sent by rail
to Guantanamo. Cruisers of State X threaten to cap-
ture these merchant vessels. They request protection of
the fleet of the United States. The commanding officer
replies that he has no authority to afford protection and
that any interference by the cruisers of State X would
be an offense against State Y. State X maintains that
Habana is essentially a hostile destination.
What position is correct ?
solution.
Habana is not a hostile destination when the United
States and State X are at war and other States are
neutral.
The position taken by the commanding officer of the
fleet of the United States is correct.
notes.
Acquisition of jurisdiction.—Prior to 1884 the acquisi-
tion of territorial jurisdiction was usually based on dis-
covery, occupation, conquest, prescription, gift, ex-
change, or on some fact which implied the possession of
sovereignty over the territory. There was also prior to
1884 a fairly well established system of protectorates,
with rights of the protector and protected defined in
agreements. With the expansion of the political inter-
ests of the leading States of the world into remote re-
gions, particularly characteristic of the last 20 years of
the nineteenth century, the claim to the right to exercise
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jurisdiction came to be based on other grounds. Such
attenuated rights as those claimed under the doctrine of
the " sphere of influence " or the " sphere of interest
"
began to be maintained. Other methods of obtaining
actual or prospective jurisdiction in smaller or weaker
States were devised. The practice of leasing territory
became common from the late years of the nineteenth
century. Some of these leases involve absolute exclusion
of the lessor State from any rights within the leased
area. Other leases only confer certain specified rights
upon the leaseholder. Some of the leases provide that
the jurisdiction over the territory shall pass back to the
lessor State in case the lessee for any reason withdraws
from the territory.
Degree of protection.—The protection given a political
unity by a State which owes it protection varies widely.
In some instances the protected community almost loses
its own identity, while in other cases the protected com-
munity is in nearly every respect equal to other States.
The protection exercised may be for the good, of all
States and may make the development of the protected
State possible. Many States are bound by treaties which
limit their freedom of action in certain respects. This
does not destroy their statehood. The action of the
State is limited by its own will and only to the extent
specified in the treaty.
Congo lease.—One of the early leases of territory was
on the part of the Congo Free State to Great Britain.
By an agreement of 1894 a strip of territory running
along the German frontier for a considerable distance
was leased to Great Britain and to be subject to British
administration for a period corresponding to that during
which Belgium should have control over the Congo terri-
tory. Germany maintained that an indefinite lease of
this character was equivalent to a cession of the terri-
tory, and would injure her political position and inter-
rupt her trade. The agreement with the neutralized
Congo Free State was terminated by Great Britain, but
apparently rather from diplomatic than from legal
reasons.
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In a note to Hall's International Law, appearing in
the fourth edition, about this time, in 1895, the legal
aspects of the Congo lease are considered
:
Great Britain could only receive a lease of the territory sub-
ject to the provisions of antecedent treaties made between the
Congo State and Germany, and notwithstanding a slight am-
biguity in the language of the treaty made in 1884 between the
two States, there can be no doubt that she would have been pre-
cluded from levying duties upon goods imported from German
sources. As regards the general " political position," the Congo
State is neutral, and the treaty provides that in the event of
cession of any part of its territory "the obligations contracted
by the association" (i. e., the Congo State) "toward the German
Empire shall be transferred to the occupier." Assuming, then,
for a moment that a lease of indefinite duration is equivalent to
a cession, the territory leased to Great Britain would have re-
mained affected by the duties of neutrality, and could not have
been used to prejudice the position of Germany. The treaty, it
should be added, contains no stipulation, express or implied, that
transfer of territory in any form should be dependent on German
consent. It is difficult, therefore, to understand the conventional
basis of the objection taken, and of legal basis in a wider sense
it is evidently destitute. The Congo State has all rights of a neu-
tral State, of which it has not been deprived by express compact.
Those rights beyond question include the right to do all State
acts which neither compromise nor tend to compromise neutrality.
In the particular case the Congo State was clearly competent to
grant a lease, because the lease carried with it, of necessity, the
obligations of neutrality. Although a lease for an indefinite time
may in certain aspects be the equivalent of a cession, in law it is
not so; a State may be able to make a cession of territory freed
from its own obligations, but in granting a lease it can not give
wider powers than it possesses itself, and consequently, altogether
apart from the treaty with Germany, the Congo State could not
disengage territory from neutral obligations by letting it out
upon a subordinate title.
It may be remarked that the Congo State is equally compe-
tent to acquire by way of lease, because the territory so acquired
can at least be invested with a neutral character at the will of
the Congo State, and probably must of necessity be considered, for
such time as the connection lasts, to be a temporary extension
of the neutral territory (p. 96, n.)
From this discussion of the Congo lease, it is evidently
the opinion that the lease can not be held to create rights
which did not appertain to the territory before it was
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leased, nor confer rights beyond those specified in the
agreement and within the competence of the lessor State.
The idea that the lease was in fact an actual alienation
of the territory seems to be contrary to law and contrary
to fact, though it may be that such leased territory may,
at some future time, more easily pass under the actual
ownership and sovereignty of the lessee. Undoubtedly
it was the intention of some lessees to follow the lease
by actual acquisition of sovereignty over the leased ter-
ritory, but on the other hand many leases specifically state
that sovereignty is not transferred, and within the last
few years there has been a growing tendency, in part,
perhaps, due to international jealousy, to insist that the
terms of such agreements be observed strictly. While
Port Arthur had been leased by China to Russia, yet
after the area came within the military occupation of
Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, the lease
did not pass in a formal manner until the consent of
China was given in the treaty of Pekin in 1905.
Establishing coaling stations.—Since the importance
of fuel has made necessary stations from which a con-
venient supply can be obtained, the States of the world
possessing navies have established stations at available
points. The character of these stations sometimes in-
volves the actual cession of sovereignty over the area ac-
quired for a fuel or naval station, or at times involves
simply a right to keep a supply ship in the territorial
waters of a foreign State.
In certain cases, in Asia and Africa, these coaling sta-
tions have become the centers of spheres of influence
which have developed into actual territorial possessions.
In establishing these coaling or naval stations the
terms of cession usually maintain that the sovereignty
remains in the State which grants the station to the for-
eign State. It is evident that for purposes of war the
responsibility for acts committed within the area must
be either in the granting or in the holding State. If the
responsibility is in the granting State, and that State
is neutral, then the use of the area for a naval or coaling
station would involve a failure to observe neutral obliga-
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tions. If the responsibility is in the holding State, and
that State is at war, the use of the station would be an act
in the ordinary course of war, and the station would be
liable to attack or to other treatment to which enemy
territory might be liable. It is also evident that such
treatment will be logical, as the agreements by which
stations are granted look specially to a condition of war.
The territory which is leased, for a coaling or naval
station gains no immunity from the consequences of
war in which the lessee is engaged from the fact that
the terms of the lease may specify that the sovereignty
over the leased territory remains in the lessor. Practice
in recent years has shown that, as in the case of Port
Arthur leased by China, the lessor's neutrality may be
recognized even when the leased territory may be the
scene of hostilities.
The treatment of areas leased before the outbreak of
hostilities and regularly occupied by the lease-holding
State should be distinguished from a neutral port which
is used as a base. As Kleen says, there are at the present
time many incentives which would lead a belligerent to
take advantage of a weak neutral
:
Ce n'est que de notre epoque que les aides de guerre de cette
categorie ont gagne une grande importance. Apr§s 1'enorme
developpeinent des inoyens d'attaque et de leurs accessoires en
suite des progres techniques, les munitions de guerre ont recu une
augmentation telle, que l'organization de depots de ces objets
sur divers points en pays etrangers mais voisins ou situes sur le
chemin pour le theatre de la guerre peut acquerir une signification
decisive pour le succes d'une armee. Et depuis que la vapeur est
devenue la force motrice des flottes, la permission accordee a une
grande marine militaire d'entretenir des depots de houille a des
stations neutres intermediaires, serait, surtout sur la route qui con-
duirait a un ennemi eloigne, d'une valeur inestimable, en facilitant
le renouvellement des moyens de locomotion et en epargnant les
longs transports. II devient d'autant plus necessaire de maintenir
le droit et le devoir des neutres de ne point accorder des permis-
sions semblables. Sans l'interdiction, les Etats neutres pius
faibles et possedant des ports d'escale commodes, seront exposes
aux pressions des puissances maritimes en guerre preteudant
aux faveurs des depots, au detriment de la tranquility et de la
neutrality de l'Etat souverain des c6tes.
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Le droit des neutres d'interdire tout depot par un
.
belligerant
chez eux n'a guere §te revoque' en doute. II fut dejii reconnu par
les premiers auteurs du droit des gens, dans le principe etabli par
eux de ne tolerer sur le territoire neutre aucune demarche qui
soit de nature a seconder les operations de guerre. Mais en outre,
depuis qu'une attention plus grande a ete fixee sur les questions
y relatives, parce qu'il y a plus de causes qu'autrefois pour la
supposition qu'elles surgissent dans la pratique, la dite interdic-
tion par les neutres leur est imposee comme un devoir. En effet,
l'abus de leurs territoires en vue de quelque depot pour la guerre
ferait du pays neutre un point d'appui des operations. (Kleen,
Lois et usages de la Neutrality, I, p. 487.)
United States, coaling and naval stations.—With the
development of what is called world politics the acquisi-
tion of strategic positions for naval purposes has become
important. To the United States this is no new idea,
and the necessity for the acquisition of naval bases has
been pressed home upon the United States.
President Johnson said, in his third annual message,
December 3, 1867
:
In our Revolutionary War ports and harbors in the West India
islands were used by our enemy, to the great injury and embar-
rassment of the United States. We had the same experience in
our second War with Great Britain. The same European policy
Cor a long time excluded us even from trade with the West Indies,
while we were at peace with all nations. In our recent Civil War
the rebels and their piratical and blockade-breaking allies found
facilities iu the same ports for the work, which they too success-
fully accomplished, of injuring and devastating the commerce
which we are now engaged in rebuilding. We labored especially
under this disadvantage, that European steam vessels employed
by our enemies found friendly shelter, protection, and supplies
in West Indian ports, while our naval operations were necessarily
carried on from our own distant shores. There was then a uni-
versal feeling of the want of an advanced naval outpost between
the Atlantic coast and Europe. The duty of obtaining such an
outpost peacefully and lawfully, while neither doing nor menacing
injury to other States, earnestly engaged the attention of the
executive department before the close of the war, and it has not
been lost sight of since that time. A not entirely dissimilar naval
want revealed itself during the same period on the Pacific coast.
The required foothold there was fortunately secured by our late
treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and it now seems imperative
that the more obvious necessities of the Atlantic coast should not
be less carefully provided for. A good and convenient port and
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harbor, capable of easy defense, will supply that want. With the
possession of such a station by the United States neither we nor
any other American nation need longer apprehend injury or offense
from any transatlantic enemy. (Richardson's Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, p. 579.)
Johnson's message was written at a time when events
had emphasized the need of " naval outposts." In the
times of quiet the same need was mentioned in the mes-
sage of President Hayes, of December 6, 1880. By the
treaty of 1884 with Hawaii the United States obtained
the right in Pearl River Harbor " to establish and main-
tain there a coaling and repair station for the use of
vessels of the United States."
With the upbuilding of the Navy of the United States
the need of coaling and other stations became clear, and
these have from time to time been acquired.
Relation of Cuba to the United States^ in consequence
of Spanish-American War.—In this situation the funda-
mental question which must be first considered is that
of the relation of the Republic of Cuba to the United
States.
By the treaty of December 10, 1898, " Spain relin-
quishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba."
(Art. I.)
This provision is unlike that in regard to Porto Rico,
Guam, and the Philippines which is, " Spain cedes to
the United States the island of Porto Rico," etc.
Before invading Cuba the United States had formally
resolved, by act of April 20, 1898
—
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its de-
termination when that is accomplished, to leave the government
and control of the island to its people. (30 U. S. Stat., p. 738.)
The first resolution in this act is
—
That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent.
Few principles have received more complete sanction
in repeated decisions than that stated by the United
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States Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. United
States in 1890:
Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not
a judicial but a political question, the determination of which,
by the legislative and executive departments of any government,
conclusively binds the judges as well as all other officers, citizens,
and subjects of that government. This principle has always been
upheld by this court and has been affirmed under a great variety
of circumstances. (137 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rpts., p. 202.)
By the act of April 20, 1898, the United States had
declared " that the people of the island of Cuba are, and
of right ought to be, free and independent." By the
treaty of December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished the
claim to sovereignty over Cuba. The United States also
disclaimed any disposition or intention to exercise " sov-
ereignty, jurisdiction, or control " over Cuba except for
its pacification.
As the courts are bound by the action of the legislative
and executive departments, the United States did not
legally obtain by the treaty that which had been form-
ally denounced, though the Government did declare its
purpose to exercise its authority for the pacification of
Cuba. The Government can accordingly exercise its
own judgment in deciding when pacification is accom-
plished. Such a state of peace and tranquillity as was
sought by the United States would be advantageous to
other States as well as to the United States.
Article XVI of the treaty between the United States
and Spain of December 10, 1898, provides that
—
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by
the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of
its occupancy thereof; but it will, upon the termination of such
occupancy, advise any government established in the island to
assume the same obligations.
It is thus declared that the rights of the United States
under this treaty come to an end with the termination of
the occupancy.
Relations of the United States and Cuba by conven-
tional agreements.—The United States have acquired
rights as regards Cuba by virtue of treaties and other
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conventional agreements. Certain aspects of the rela-
tions under conventional agreements were considered in
the Naval War College International Law Situations of
1907. Situation I.
Coaling and naval stations in Cuba.—The so-called " Piatt
amendment " of March 2, 1901, provided
:
" That in fulfillment of the declaration contained in the joint
resolution approved April twentieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, entitled ' For the recognition of the independence of the
people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relin- ;
uuish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and
to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban
waters, and directing the President of the United States to use
the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these
resolutions into effect,' the President is hereby authorized to
* leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its
people' so soon as a government shall have been established in
said island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof
or in an ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future rela-
tions of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follow : "
Among the promises defining the relations of the United States
with Cuba the seventh is as follows
:
" That to enable the United States to maintain the independence
of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own
defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United
States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain
specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the
United States." (31 U. S. Stat. L.. 895.)
The articles of this amendment became an appendix to the con-
stitution of Cuba promulgated on the 20th of May, 1902. By an
agreement between the United States and Cuba, February 16-23,
1903, the Republic of Cuba leased certain areas in Guantanamo
and in northern Cuba to the United States for the purposes of
coaling and naval stations. In regard to Article I of this agree-
ment, which defines the areas leased, the second and third articles
of the agreement say
:
" Article II.
" The grant of the foregoing article shall include the right to
use and occupy the waters adjacent to said areas of land and
water, and to improve and deepen the entrances thereto and the
anchorages therein, and generally to do any and all things neces-
sary to fit the premises for use as coaling or naval stations only,
and for no other purpose.
" Vessels engaged in the Cuban trade shall have free passage
through the waters included within this grant.
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"Article III,
" While on the one hand the United States recognizes the con-
tinuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over
the above-described areas of land and water, on the other hand
the Republic of Cuba consents that during the period- of the occu-
pation by the United States of said areas under the terms of this
agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction
and control over and within said areas, with the right to acquire
(under conditions to be hereafter agreed upon by the two Govern-
ments) for the public purposes of the United States any land or
other property therein by purchase or by exercise of eminent
domain, with full compensation to the owners thereof."
These areas, commonly called Guantanamo and Bahia Honda,.
are therefore leased to the United States and not ceded. The
United States, therefore, has only a qualified jurisdiction over
these regions and not sovereignty, as in Porto Rico and the
Philippines, and the conditions of exercise of jurisdiction in these
leased areas are accordingly unlike the conditions within the
areas over which the United States exercise sovereignty.
The exercise of jurisdiction in leased areas varies according
to the provisions of the lease.
By the terms of the lease between the United States
and the Republic of Cuba, signed July 2, 1903
:
Article I. The United States of America agrees and covenants
to pay to the Republic of Cuba the annual sum of two thousand
dollars, in gold coin of the United States, as long as the former
shall occupy and use said areas of land by virtue of said agree-
ment.
Art. V. Materials of all kinds, merchandise, stores and muni-
tions of war imported into said areas for exclusive use and con-
sumption therein shall not be subject to payment of customs
duties nor any other fees or charges, and the vessels which may
carry same shall not be subject to payment of port, tonnage,
anchorage, or other fees, except in case said vessels shall be
discharged without the limits of said areas; and said vessels
shall not be discharged without the limits of said areas otherwise
than through a regular port of entry of the Republic of Cuba,
when both cargo and vessel shall be subject to all Cuban customs
laws and regulations and payment of corresponding duties and
fees.
It is further agreed that such materials, merchandise, stores
and munitions of war shall not be transported from said areas
into Cuban territory.
Art. VI. Except as provided in the preceding article, vessels
entering into or departing from the Bays of Guantanamo and
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Bahia Hondo, within the limits of Cuban territory, shall be sub-
ject exclusively to Cuban laws and authorities, and orders emanat-
ing from the latter in all that respects port police, customs or
health, and authorities of the United States shall place no ob-
stacle in the way of entrance and departure of said vessels, except
in case of a state of war. (Treaties and Conventions between
the United States and Other Powers, 1770-1909, Vol, I, p. 360.)
By the convention of May 22, 1903, which was pro-
claimed July 2, 1904, the relations of the United States
and Cuba were defined according to the terms of the
Piatt amendment of March 2, 1901, as follows:
I. That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any
treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which
will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in
any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers
to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or
otherwise lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.
II. That said Government shall not assume or contract any
public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reason-
able sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which,
the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current
expenses of government, shall be inadequate.
III. That the Government of Cuba consents that the United
States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation
of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate
for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for
discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the
treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and
undertaken by the Government of Cuba.
IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its
military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all
lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and pro-
tected.
V. That the Government of Cuba will execute, and as far as
necessary extend, the plans already devised, or other plans to be
mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the .cities of the
island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious
diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the
people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the
southern ports of the United States and the people residing
therein.
VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed
constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to
future adjustment by treaty.
VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the inde-
pendence of Cuba and to protect the people thereof, as well as
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for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease
to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations
-at certain specified points to be agreed upon with the President
of the United States.
VIII. That by way of further assurance the Government of,
Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty
with the United States. (31 U. S. Stat. L., p. 895; Treaties and
Conventions, 1776-1909, Vol. I, p. 362.)
The above provisions were also embodied in the Cuban
constitution of 1901, which was promulgated May 20,
1902, on which date the United States withdrew " as an
intervening power." The articles contain the provisions
bearing on the relations of the United States and Cuba
so far as concern the international conditions under con-
sideration.
The first article limits the right of Cuba to make com-
pacts with foreign powers which will impair Cuban
independence or to alienate control of territory.
The second article limits the power to incur indebted-
ness.
The third article gives the United States right to in-
tervene to preserve Cuban independence and maintain
orderly government.
Articles 4, 5, 6, and 8 have no particular bearing on the
situation under consideration.
Article 7 provides for the sale or lease to the United
States of lands for coaling or naval stations.-
Undoubtedly the United States has by this and other
agreements acquired a certain control over Cuba. The
intention of the Republic of Cuba was to confine the
grant of privileges and rights to the United States by
a strict and narrow interpretation. The message of the
President of Cuba of November 2, 1903
;
says
—
•of two formulas of grant, " sale or lease "—of portions of
territory to which the United States had the right for the estab-
lishment of naval and coaling stations—the one that would least
wound Cuban sentiment was accepted. Of such stations we
granted the least number possible, and the conditions inserted in
the convention regulating the lease of the same are so many
more limitations of that grant, all favorable to the Republic of
Cuba. (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 365.)
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Importation of war materials.—Article 5 of the lease
of 1903 provides that supplies and munitions of war shall
not be subject to customs and other dues if destined for
exclusive use in the leased area and discharged therein.
Discharge at other points makes such goods liable to
regular customs laws.
The United States is therefore specifically prohibited
the enjoyment of exceptional advantages in respect to
other ports than those held under lease and has no excep-
tional advantages elsewhere for importation of supplies
for the leased areas.
Interpretation of lease.—The legal consequences which
flow from a lease are not such as follow the transfer of
sovereignty. If a State, the neutrality of which is guar-
anteed or whose jurisdiction over a certain area is in any
way qualified as a State, should lease a part of the area,
the lease would carry with it only such rights as the
lessor was competent to grant according to the maxim
" nemo plus juris in alteram transferre protest, quam ipse
habet." Such leases are, therefore, strictly construed. It
is conceivable that a State which has made a lease of
a part of its territory to a foreign State might go to
war with the State which held the lease or it might re-
main neutral. In the event of neutrality, however, the
leased territory under the jurisdiction of the belligerent
would, according to its character, be liable to the conse-
quences of war. If the leased territory was merely for
the purpose of a scientific experiment station, a hospital,
or lighthouse, it would be liable to treatment as such; if
a naval base or fortification, its liability would corre-
spond. If the lease was made in good faith and not
during a war, with the purpose of furnishing the belliger-
ent with a base, the lessor State would not be violating
any obligation.
The United States in its leased territory is entitled to
the privileges and bound by the obligations of the leases.
In the case of Cuba certain international negotiations
may be carried on by the Cuban Government without
consideration of the United States. The Cuban Army
may be organized in accord with Cuban desires. Cer-
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tain, acts which might imperil the existence of Cuba as
a State may not be undertaken because prohibited by the
treaty with the United States.
The Ionian Islands.—Article I of the treaty of Paris of
November 5, 1815, between " Great Britain and Austria,
Prussia, and Russia, respecting the Ionian Islands," pro-
vides that certain named islands " shall form a single,
free, and independent State, under the denomination of
the United States of the Ionian Islands."
Article II provides that
—
This State shall be placed under the mandate and exclusive
protection of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors.
The remaining articles provide for the exercise of this
right of protection, Article V stating:
In order to insure, without restriction, to the inhabitants of the
United States of the Ionian Islands the advantages resulting from
the high protection under which these States are placed, as well
as for the exercise of the rights inherent in the said protection,
His Britannic Majesty shall have the right to occupy fortresses
and places of those States and to maintain garrisons in the same.
The military force of the said United States shall also be under
orders of the commander in chief of the troops of His Britannic
Majesty.
And in Article VII
:
The trading flag of the United States of the Ionian Islands shall
be acknowledged by all the contracting parties as the flag of a
free and independent State. (I Hertslet, Map of Europe by
Treaty, pp. 337-341.)
In 1854, during the Crimean War, while the above
treaty was still in effect and Great Britain at war with
Kussia, certain Ionian ships were captured by British
cruisers on the ground that " being British subjects they
were illegally trading with the enemy." This raised the
question " whether the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands
were to be considered as British subjects or not." The
question was elaborately argued and came before Dr.
Lushington for judgment.
For the purposes of decision the vessel proceeded
against was an Ionian vessel under the Ionian flag bound
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for a Eussian port and captured by a British cruiser. It
was claimed "that as regards a power hostile to Great
Britain the Ionian islanders stand in the same position
as British subjects." As the Ionian Islands had not de-
clared war, the further question arose " whether, Great
Britain being at war with Russia, it follows as an in-
evitable consequence that the Ionian States are placed at
war with Russia also. * * * Whether, Great Brit-
ain being at war with Russia, the Ionian States are ex
necessitate at war also, exactly in the same way as Jersey,
Guernsey, Jamaica, and Canada would be placed in hos-
tility by a declaration of war against Great Britain by
any other power." (2 Spinks, Ecclesiastical and Ad-
miralty Reports, pp. 212, 216.) Dr. Lushington main-
tained that while Great Britain, as a result of her con-
quests in 1815, might have made a different disposition of
the Ionian Islands, she did actually determine their status
by the treaty of 1815, and Dr. Lushington adds that he
is of the opinion that no right remained to Great Britain
other than " can be found within the four corners of that
treaty. * * * From this document must be derived
all the rights of the contracting parties and all the rights
and obligations of her Ionian States."
Dr. Lushington maintains that Great Britain by the
treaty had extreme rights over the Ionian Islands. He
says:
I will now make a short summary of this treaty ; it will show
some of the anomalies. A single, free, and independent State, hav-
ing the flag of a free and independent State—the military, naval,
and diplomatic power all vested in the protecting State—the pro-
tected, not the subjects of the protector, nor British subjects,
for that is perfectly clear. (Ibid., p. 220.)
Application of Dr. Lushington's reasoning.—The case
of the Ionian ships offers certain parallels which make it
possible to apply Dr. Lushington's reasoning to the re-
lations between the United States and Cuba. The rela-
tions between the United States and Cuba are far less
close than were those between Great Britain and the
Ionian States; therefore Dr. Lushington's conclusions
would in general apply more emphatically to the rela-
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tions of the United States and Cuba. He maintains that
war between a protecting and a foreign State does not
necessarily involve the protected State in war. He fur-
ther concludes that if Great Britain had a right to make
a declaration of war involving the Ionian States, this
could not be done without express statement; and that
hostile character could not be imposed upon the protected
State in absence of an agreement whose terms were not
open to doubt. Dr. Lushington restored the captured
property as not concerned in the war. Cuba and Cuban
property in time of war between the United States and
a foreign power would, according to the treaty between
the United States and Cuba, be less closely related to the
war than was the Ionian property in 1854.
Application of Declaration of London.—In this situa-
tion it is granted that the Declaration of London is bind-
ing. While the Declaration had not been proclaimed up
to July, 1912, the principles of the Declaration were
accepted by Italy as binding in the Turco-Italian War
of 1911-12. The Italian attitude is shown as follows
:
By a royal decree of October 13 the following instructions were
approved in conformity with the principles of the Declaration of
Paris, April 16, 1856, which belligerent countries are bound to
respect, with the rules of The Hague Conventions of October 18,
1907, and of the Declaration of London of February 26, 1909,
which the Government of the King desires to be respected as
well, so far as the provisions of the laws in force in the Kingdom
allow, although they have not yet been ratified by Italy; and
they will serve to regulate the conduct of naval commanders in
the operations of capture and prize during the war. (Dispatch to
U. S. State Dept, Oct. 19, 1911.)
From the action of Italy it may be inferred that even
if not ratified the Declaration of London will be regarded
as the most satisfactory available statement of the prin-
ciples of international law relating to maritime capture.
It is admitted in this situation that supplies of the con-
traband are being carried by merchant vessels of a neu-
tral State to Habana, when they may be sent by rail to
Guantanamo, which is a naval station of the United
States. Under the rules prevailing in regard to continu-
ous voyage before the Declaration of London, such a
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cargo might be regarded, according to the practice of
the United States, as conditional contraband, but the op-
position of other States to the position of the United
States led to the abandonment of this position in 1909,
provided the Declaration of London should be ratified.
Article 35 of the Declaration of London and the general
report upon the same shows that conditional contraband
is not liable to capture under the declaration if destined
for discharge in a neutral port.
Aeticle 35.
—
Conditional contraband is not liable to' capture,
except on board a vessel ivhich is bound for territory belonging
to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy,
and which is not to discharge it at an intervening neutral port.
The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage
on ivhich the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of
the goods, unless she is met %oith clearly out of the course indi-
cated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to
justify such deviation.
As lias been said above, the doctrine of continuous voyage is
excluded for conditional contrabrand. This then is liable to
capture only if it is to be discharged in an enemy port. As soon
as the goods are documented to be discharged in a neutral port
they can not be contraband, and there is no examination as to
whether they are to be forwarded to the enemy by sea or land
from that neutral port. This is the essential difference from
absolute contraband.
The ship's papers furnish complete proof as to the voyage of
the vessel and as to the place of discharge of the cargo; it would
be otherwise if the vessel were encountered having manifestly
deviated from the route which she should follow according to
her papers, and unable to give sufficient reasons to justify such
deviation.
This rule as to the proof furnished by the ship's papers aims
to prevent claims lightly raised by a cruiser and giving rise to
unjustifiable captures. It must not be understood in a manner
too absolute which would make all frauds easy. Thus it does not
hold good when the vessel is encountered at sea having mamU
festly deviated from the route which she ought to have followed,
and unable to justify such deviation. The ship's papers are then
contradicted by the actual facts and lose all value as evidence;
the cruiser will be free to decide according to the case. In the
same way, the visit and search of the vessel may reveal facts
which prove in an irrefutable manner that the destination of
the vessel or the place of discharge of the goods is incorrectly
entered in the ship's papers. The commander of the cruiser is
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then free to judge of the circumstances and captures or does not
capture the vessel according to his judgment. To resume, the
ship's papers are proof, unless the facts show their evidence to
be false. This limitation of the value of the ship's papers as
proof seems self-evident and not to need special mention. It has
not been the aim to appear to weaken the force of the general
rule, which forms a safeguard for neutral trade.
Because a single entry is shown to be false, it does not follow
that the force of the ship's papers as evidence is nullified as a
whole. The entries against which no allegation of fraud can be
proved retain their value. (International Law Topics—Naval
War College—1909, p. 85.)
British opinion,—Norman Bentwich, discussing the
operation of article 35 from its application particularly
to Great Britain, says
:
But when the enemy country has ports of its own the exclusion
of the doctrine of continuous voyage from the subject of condi-
tional contraband is justified by reason of the nature of the
traffic.
One might judge from the comments of some critics of the
declaration that this limitation of the right to capture conditional
contraband was an outrageous curtailment of our belligerent
rights. Yet, in fact, we have never effectually exercised the right
to capture cargoes on their way to the enemy country via neu-
tral ports, even when they were absolute contraband; and Lord
Stowell explicitly and emphatically repudiated the practice. The
declaration now entitles us to do so in that contingency, but
rejects the claim which has been advanced by others to capture
cargoes of conditional contraband which are destined to neutral
ports. It is submitted that the limitation of the right of capture
is both reasonable and to our benefit. Conditional contraband
cargoes are ex hypothesi such as might be regularly required by
the neutral population, and it would always be possible for the
consignor to direct them in the first place to a neutral consignee
in the neutral country, who might forward them at a favorable
opportunity to the belligerent country. And to allow capture
upon suspicion that an eventual belligerent destination was in-
tended would be an excessive interference with neutral trade,
which would inevitably cause friction. Cargoes of absolute con-
traband, on the other hand, being of such things as are exclu-
sively valuable in war, would probably find their way, in nine
out of ten cases, from a neighboring neutral to a belligerent
country; and therefore capture is allowed, though their immedi-
ate destination is seemingly innocent, when there is evidence that
this is not the final destination. The effect of the restriction of
capture in cases of conditional contraband would be. if we were
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at war, to give immunity to all cargoes of the kind consigned to
England via neutral ports, and to render them liable to capture
only during their transit of the narrow seas which separate us
from our continental neighbors, some of whom are in any case
likely to be neutral. Hence, while the restriction would dimin-
ish our power of capturing conditional contraband destined for
a continental enemy in very exceptional circumstances only, it
would regularly benefit us when at war by diminishing his
power of interfering with our supplies which must be brought
by sea. The present practice of nations has not hitherto defi-
nitely accepted the doctrine of continuous voyage in its relation
to contraband; as has been mentioned, the American courts put
it into force amid protests during the Civil War, and England
claimed to enforce it during the Boer War, but did not press her
claim because of German opposition to it. The declaration as-
sures us the benefit of the doctrine as belligerents in regard to
absolute contraband, which is the trading by the neutral that
more seriously assists in war; and it secures us both as belliger-
ents and neutrals against any attempt by a foreign power to apply
the doctrine to other neutral cargoes. (The Declaration of Lon-
don, p. 75.)
Protection by the fleet of the United States.—In the
proposed situation the merchant vessel of State Y which
is neutral requests protection from the fleet of the United
States which is belligerent. The commanding officer re-
plies that he has no authority to afford this protection.
To afford such protection would usually be outside the
competence of a naval officer unless instructed or acting
under treaty provisions. If the United States fleet
should afford protection the act would be of the nature
of belligerent convoy. A neutral vessel which accepts
belligerent convoy loses her neutral character according
to the present general consensus of opinion.
The neutral vessel may not itself resist visit and search,
but by sailing under the protection of a belligerent there
is on the part of the neutral vessel a constructive resist-
ance which would make the vessel liable to condemnation
even though otherwise innocent. It is not to be inferred
that any action which the United States fleet might take
in pursuing the enemy in the neighborhood or in attempt-
ing to prevent interference with commerce if in the
nature of the prosecution of the war and not simply an
act of convoy, would necessarily involve the merchant
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vessel in any liability. As the merchant vessel might
become liable to more severe treatment if accorded pro-
tection by the United States fleet and as the United States
fleet could attack the enemy, in any case, if deemed at the
time a proper military movement there would seem to be
nothing to be gained for the United States fleet or for the
merchant vessel in extending the protection requested.
Relation of State Y.—The capture of the merchant ves-
sel of State Y which is carrying goods of the nature of
conditional contraband to Habana would, as has been
shown, not be justified under the provisions of the Decla-
ration of London, which is assumed to be binding, unless
Habana is regarded as a belligerent port when the United
States is at war. As Cuba is an independent State in the
family of nations, and as it has not made any alliance
which makes it a party to a war in which the United
States is involved, Cuba's relations would be those of a
neutral State and Habana would be a neutral port.
Resume.—From the consideration of the nature of
leased territory it is seen that the belligerency of the
lease-holding State does not affect the relations of the
State which grants the lease except so far as is stated in
the lease.
The jurisdiction over the leased territory is determined
by the terms of the lease. A protecting State may go to
war without involving the State protected in hostilities.
The relations between the United States and Cuba are
such that Cuba may remain neutral in a war to which the
United States is a party in the same manner as Mexico
might remain neutral.
The mere fact of proximity to the United States would
in both cases make necessary somewhat greater care in
the preservation of neutrality. Conditional contraband
would not, under the declaration of London, when bound
for a neutral port on a neutral vessel be liable to capture.
The extension of protection to a neutral merchant vessel
by a belligerent war vessel would make an innocent
merchant vessel liable to penalty. It would be best to
allow the neutral State to protect its own merchant ves-
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sels and the interest of all States not engaged in the war
would tend to cause the belligerents to respect neutral
rights.
SOLUTION.
Habana is not a hostile destination when the United
States and State X are at war and other States are
neutral.
The position taken by the commanding officer of the
fleet of the United States is correct.
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